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A growing literature argues that the Information Technology rev-
olution caused the stock market crash of 1973-1974, its subsequent
stagnation and eventual recovery. This paper employs general equi-
librium theory to test whether this good news hypothesis is consistent
with the behavior of US equity prices and with the trends in corpo-
rate output, investment and consumption. I ￿nd it is not. A model
based exclusively on good news can make equity prices fall as much
as in the data but it must also imply a strong economic expansion
right when the US economy stagnated. However, when the observed
productivity slowdown in old production methods is incorporated into
the model consistency with major macroeconomic aggregates can be
achieved and a 20% drop in equity values can be accounted for. (JEL
E44, O33, O41)
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11 Introduction
It has been argued that the mid 1970s marked the beginning of a new indus-
trial revolution, associated with the introduction of information technologies
(cf. Greenwood and Yorukoglu [13], Greenwood and Jovanovic [14], Hobijn
and Jovanovic [18]). The start of this Information Technology (IT) revolu-
tion coincides with one of the largest and more persistent declines in market
capitalization ever experienced by the US stock market. During 1973-1974
the market value of existing corporations, shown in Figure 1 as ratio of their
net capital stock1 (i.e., Tobin￿ s average q), went down by 50% and did not
recover until the 1990s.
Figure 1: Market value of US corporations as ratio to the replacement cost
of their tangible assets
A growing literature suggests there is a causal link between these two events,
and that the arrival and di⁄usion of information technologies have been an
important force driving ￿ uctuations in equity prices. Roughly speaking,
1Figure 1 is based on data from the ￿ ow of funds (market value) and the wealth tables
(capital stock) reported by the BEA (see the data appendix for the details). The timing
and magnitude of the major movements observed in this ￿gure are robust to the use of
the improved investment and capital stock data in Gordon [12].
2this good news hypothesis states that the IT-revolution rendered old cap-
ital obsolete, causing its market value to collapse. New technologies grad-
ually replaced the old ones, and the stock market smoothly recovered (e.g.
Greenwood and Jovanovic [14], Hobijn and Jovanovic [18] and Laitner and
Stolyarov [22]).
In this paper I measure the extent to which the good news hypothesis
can provide a consistent explanation of the stock market collapse of 1974, its
subsequent stagnation and recovery. My analysis focuses on the 1974-1990
period, and it does not try to account for the boom and subsequent collapse
in equity prices of 1990-2002. I give a particular emphasis to the study of
what Hall [16] calls the ￿single hardest episode to understand￿about the
behavior of US equity markets: the market value of US corporations was
much lower than the replacement cost of their tangible assets, i.e. Tobin￿ s
average q was lower than one, from 1974 to 1990.
The framework of this study is an inter-temporal general equilibrium
model of capital asset pricing. The rules of the exercise are simple. A model
is considered successful if it accounts for the observed movements in Tobin￿ s
average q and if it is also consistent with the behavior of the US corporate
output, investment and consumption.
To evaluate the quantitative aspects of the good news hypothesis I use a
one-sector neoclassical growth model with perfect competition. Investment
decisions are irreversible and capital is technology speci￿c. The latter two
assumptions are standard in the literature and allow the price of installed
capital to fall below its replacement cost2. Following existing theories, I
analyze the e⁄ects of two di⁄erent types of shocks. In the ￿rst one agents
learn of the future arrival of a new, better, technology (as in Greenwood and
Jovanovic [14] or Hobijn and Jovanovic [18]) and realize that existing produc-
tion methods, and all of the capital therein installed, are about to become
2Certain taxes also break the equality between market value and replacement cost (e.g.
McGrattan and Prescott [25]).
3obsolete. A calibrated version of the model shows that learning about the
future arrival of a better technology has no e⁄ect on Tobin￿ s average q: The
second type of shock I consider consists of the actual arrival of a new better
technology (as in Laitner and Stolyarov [22] or Jovanovic and Rousseau [20]).
Numerical experiments show that even in an extreme setup where investment
is completely irreversible, and capital immobile across existing technologies,
for equity prices to fall as much as in the data the model must imply a two-
fold increase in investment and a strong expansion of corporate GDP and
consumption. These predictions are orthogonal to what one observes in the
data.
A theory for asset pricing ￿ uctuations based exclusively on good news
cannot be reconciled with certain features of the US data. However, a very
important factor has been left out of the analysis. The 1974 collapse of
the US stock market also coincides with a dramatic decline in the growth
rate of total factor productivity. The average growth rate of total factor
productivity during 1973-89 was three times lower than the corresponding
average for 1948-73. Productivity growth recovered in the late 1990s and
the stock market boomed. Jorgenson [19] performs a growth accounting
decomposition of the US economy from 1948 to 2002 splitting the economy in
IT producing sectors and non-IT producing sectors (computed as a residual).
His main ￿nding is that the productivity slowdown of the mid 1970s was
localized in non-IT producing sectors and that almost all productivity growth
between 1973 and 1989 can be attributed to large productivity gains in IT
producing sectors. During the mid 1990s information technologies spread out
to other sectors of the economy and total factor productivity recovered.
Motivated by Jorgenson￿ s ￿ndings, I evaluate the quantitative implica-
tions for market values and other major macroeconomic aggregates of the
good news hypothesis, but this time paired with a bad news shock. Bad
news correspond to an unexpected slowdown of old production technologies
comparable to the one in the data. Consistency with major macroeconomic
4aggregates is achieved. Moreover, I ￿nd that the unexpected arrival of infor-
mation technologies and the productivity slowdown can account for a 20%
drop in equity values.
2 Related literature
Jovanovic and Rousseau [20] show that the unexpected arrival of a better
technology causes a sudden drop in Tobin￿ s average q: The authors are, how-
ever, interested in explaining the merger waves of the US economy. Mergers
are, in their view, a way for the economy to reallocate resources from low q
￿rms to high q ￿rms. For the purpose of studying resource reallocation, the
authors develop a model in which capital can be transferred across di⁄erent
technologies. As a result, the decline in market value predicted by their the-
ory is much smaller than what my model achieves. Finally, and because of
the nature of the questions that Jovanovic and Rousseau [20] address, their
paper does not contrast the macroeconomic implications of the IT revolution
against the data. The latter is one of the main objectives of my study.
The closest paper in spirit and basic intuition is Laitner and Stolyarov
[22]. The authors analyze the negative impact of a technology revolution
on the stock market using a general equilibrium framework. Two things
distinguish their study from mine. First, they assume a ￿xed saving rate,
which makes their model not suitable for studying the implications of the
IT-revolution on aggregate saving and investment. As I show later on, ￿xing
the saving rate hides one of the main counterfactual implications of the good
news hypothesis. In my theoretical analysis the saving rate is endogenous.
Second, Laitner and Stolyarov [22] see the IT-revolution as a once-and-for-all
increase in an otherwise constant level of total factor productivity. Accord-
ing to their model, the growth of per capita GDP should have declined
monotonically after the arrival of the IT-revolution. That is not what we see
in the US data. I instead capture the IT-revolution as a temporary change
5in an exogenously growing level of total factor productivity so that GDP per
capita has a constant long-run growth rate.
My theory ignores intangible capital so as to give the good news hy-
pothesis its best chance at accounting for the low market valuations of the
mid 1970s. As Hall [17] points out, if one includes intangible capital into the
analysis one would also have to explain why intangibles suddenly disappeared
during 1974-90, and why ￿rms chose to accumulate assets of zero or negative
returns for more than a decade. McGrattan and Prescott [25] and Li [23]
have computed some indirect measures of intangible capital and conclude
that movements in intangibles cannot account for the observed ￿ uctuations
in Tobin￿ s average q.
A complementary explanation for the stock market collapse of 1974, which
is also based on technological change, is given by Alpanda and Peralta-Alva
[1]. According to the authors, the energy crisis of the mid 1970s gave agents
the incentives to develop a new energy-saving technology. The introduction
of an energy-saving technology rendered existing capital obsolete. Old cap-
ital was left to depreciate, the expected ￿ ow of dividends it paid suddenly
decreased, and its market value collapsed. In that model the energy crisis
also generates an economic slowdown consistent with the data. The paper
concludes that the energy price hike of the mid 1970s, together with the
energy-saving innovation it triggered, can account for more than half of the
observed drop in market valuations. Wei [35] also evaluates the impact of
the energy crisis on the stock market. However, she focuses on a putty-clay
model where higher energy prices a⁄ect market values via higher total costs
and lower dividend ￿ ows. As the share of energy in total costs is small, in
her framework the energy crisis translates into a 2% drop in market values.
The trends in the US stock market have also been studied by McGrattan
and Prescott [25]. These authors compute the impact of changes in taxes
and the regulatory system across di⁄erent long-run equilibria of a neoclas-
sical growth model. Their ￿ndings suggest taxes and regulations have the
6potential for explaining one half of the 1974 collapse in equity prices and
most of the expansion of the 1990s. Bian [4] has computed the full dynamic
transition for McGrattan and Prescott￿ s model. McGrattan and Prescott￿ s
model implies that the market value of the ￿rm at any given year must be
proportional to the replacement value of its capital stock, where the con-
stant of proportion depends (only) on current tax laws. In their balanced
growth analysis, McGrattan and Prescott assume the capital stock of US
corporations to be constant during the mid 1970s, which is not consistent
with available data on US corporate capital. According to Bian (op. cit.),
the observed increase in corporate capital together with the full dynamic
behavior of the di⁄erent taxes and regulations emphasized by McGrattan
and Prescott, result in an almost imperceptible drop in the US stock market
during the 1974-1980 period.
3 The model
This section describes a general equilibrium asset-pricing model with capital
accumulation and production, based on Brock [5], to evaluate the quan-
titative implications of the good news hypothesis. The saving rate is en-
dogenously determined so as to quantify the e⁄ects of the IT-revolution on
aggregate investment. Once capital accumulation and endogenous savings
are included in the analysis good news have a dramatically di⁄erent e⁄ect
on equity prices than what Greenwood and Jovanovic [14], Hobijn and Jo-
vanovic [18] and Laitner and Stolyarov[22] obtain. I also assume capital to
be technology-speci￿c and irreversible, as is standard in the literature (e.g.
Dixit and Pindyck [9], and Sargent [33])3.
I now describe the model in detail, de￿ne a competitive equilibrium, and
3For an optimal growth model to generate values of q below one, a positive cost of
transforming capital into consumption, and of moving capital across di⁄erent technolo-
gies, must exist. The present model takes this assumption to the extreme giving the
IT-hypothesis its best shot at explaining the stock market collapse of the mid 1970s.
7obtain a characterization for Tobin￿ s average q:
3.1 Households and equity markets





where t indexes time and c is per-capita consumption. Each household has
nt units of time, and supplies them inelastically to the labor market. The
household￿ s problem consists of choosing the sequences of consumption and
asset holdings that maximize utility subject to its budget constraint
1 X
t=0
pt fct + Vt(st+1 ￿ st)g ￿
1 X
t=0
pt fdtst + wtntg
0 < ￿ < 1; st ￿ 0; s0 given:
I denote by st the number of shares held at the beginning of period t; and
by Vt the price per share. The wage rate is denoted by wt, and dividends
per-share by dt: Household￿ s income equals labor earnings, wtnt; plus total
dividend income, dtst: Expenditures are consumption, ct, and net purchases
of shares of stocks, Vt(st+1 ￿ st):
At every given period there is one perfectly divisible equity share out-
standing. Hence, market clearing in the market for shares requires st = 1 for
all t (per person).
3.2 Firms and aggregate resource constraints
Firms have potential access to two di⁄erent technologies (and types of cap-
ital, k1 and k2) and hire labor to produce an identical output good. The
productivity sequences for each of the two production functions, A1 and A2;
8respectively, follow a deterministic exogenous process. Corporate output is
taxed over time at a constant rate ￿y: Tax revenues are wasted by the gov-
ernment (thrown into the ocean). The problem of the representative ￿rm










f(1 ￿ ￿y)Fi(ki;t;Ai;tni;t) ￿ wtni;t ￿ xi;tg
#
s:t:
ki;t+1 = xi;t + (1 ￿ ￿)ki;t
Ai;t+1 = ￿iAi;t
xi;t ￿ 0 for i = 1;2 (1)
0 < ￿ ￿ 1;￿ ￿ 1
given A1;0; A2;0; k1;0 and k2;0: (2)
The constraints in (1) imply that investment is irreversible. Newly pro-
duced goods can be either consumed or used to augment the stock of capital.
But once designated as a given type of capital, they cannot be physically
converted into consumption. Finally, the economy￿ s aggregate resource con-
straints are




n1;t + n2;t = nt for all t:
3.3 Competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices fpt;Vtg
1
t=0 and allocations of
consumption, asset holdings, investment, capital, and labor fct;st+1;x1;t;x2;t;
9k1;t+1; k2;t+1;n1;t;n2;tg1
t=0 such that
1. Given prices, fct;st+1g are a solution to the household￿ s problem
2. Given prices, fx1;t;x2;t;k1;t+1;k2;t+1;n1;t;n2;tg solve the problem of the
￿rm, and
3. Markets clear, so that fct;st;x1;t;x2;t;k1;t+1;k2;t+1;n1;t;n2;tg satisfy the
aggregate resource constraints (AR), and st = 1 for all t:
As a consequence of the aggregate resource constraints (AR), and of the laws
of motion of capital, one has
Remark 3.1 In terms of period t consumption, the replacement cost of each
unit of capital is constant and equal to one
It is now possible to relate the theory to the data4 in Figure 1. Market
capitalization in the model, as of the end of period t; equals Vt, and that is
the numerator of q: The model￿ s replacement cost of existing capital at the
beginning of period t + 1 is k1 + k2. The latter is the denominator of q, and
thus





4A complete model of the US economy would have a corporate and a non-corporate
sector. That can be done a more precise mapping to the data would be achieved. The
results I obtained when simulating such a model were essentially the same as the ones
presented here. However, the analysis was much more convoluted and harder to relate
to the existing literature. For the sake of simplicity, and knowing the aforementioned
inconsistency is irrelevant for the results, I use a one sector model in all of what follows.
10The next two sections of the paper derive the quantitative implications of
di⁄erent types of good news shocks. Section 4 studies the impact of learning
about the future arrival of a better technology. Section 5 considers, ￿rst,
a good news shock consisting of the actual arrival of a better technology.
Then, it examines the quantitative implications of good news paired with a
productivity slowdown in old technologies. Section 6 concludes.
The framework of analysis considered in this study is that of a perfectly
competitive, one-sector neoclassical growth model. Two facts suggest that a
one-sector model is appropriate for evaluating the e⁄ects of the IT-revolution
on US equity prices. First, the total market value of each and every one of
the two-digit SIC industries reported by CRSP went down by at least 30%
from 1972 to 1974. Hence, the stock market crash of 1973-74 was present
in all sectors of the economy and can be studied within an aggregate model.
Second, the main theoretical implications tested here extend without change
to a more general multi-sector environment. In particular, for Tobin￿ s av-
erage q to fall below one in a multi-sector model (where capital is sector
and technology speci￿c) it is necessary for at least one of the irreversibility
constraints to bind along the equilibrium path (compare this to Propositions
4.1 and 5.1 below). My analysis is also constrained to a perfectly compet-
itive economy, which seems to be a good starting point for this study. In
particular, the data suggests that the stock market crash was not caused by
the potential loss of monopolic rents associated to the entry of new ￿rms -
which are the ones that have the comparative advantage in adopting the new
technologies -. If the stock market crash of 1973-74 was caused by a decrease
in the monopoly power of incumbent ￿rms then the level of industrial con-
centration (one of the standard measures for the level of monopoly power)
should have decreased as a result of the IT-revolution. The empirical papers
by Attaran and Sagha￿ [3] and O￿ Neill [27] do not validate to the previous
implication. If anything, the level of concentration increased during 1974-84.
11Secondly, the market value to output ratio of the 1972 incumbents5 started
recovering from its 1973-74 fall around 1986. If incumbents were to lose their
monopoly rents as a result of increased competition then their market value
to output ratio should not have recovered. Finally, if this hypothesis was
true then one should ￿nd a strong negative correlation between the cash￿ ow
of incumbents and that of the new ￿rms entering the market. In contrast to
this one ￿nds that the actual correlation between cash￿ ows is either positive
or statistically insigni￿cant6.
4 News about the future arrival of a better
technology
4.1 The economic environment before the shock
Before the arrival of good news, both, technology and capital of type 2 are
not available. Thus, k2 and x2 are constrained to be zero. I assume F1 and
F2 to be homogeneous of degree one, and that the share of total income going
to labor is constant and equal to 1￿￿: Any change in this state of a⁄airs is
thought to be impossible.
To simplify the analysis, I also assume that the production and the
utility functions satisfy the following Inada-type conditions: F1;F2 and u
are strictly increasing, strictly concave, limki!0
@
@kiFi(ki;Aini) = 1, and
limki!1
@
@kiFi(ki;Aini) = 0 for i = 1;2. Finally, limc!0 u0(c) = 1 and
limc!1 u0(c) = 0:
5The market value to output ratio of incumbents I talk about consists of the aggre-
gate market value to sales ratio of the ￿rms that were listed in the Standard and Poor￿ s
compustat data base in any year previous to 1972.
6In particular, the correlation between the time series behavior of the operating income
(item13) to sales (item12) ratio of US ￿rms listed in compustat before 1972 (the incum-
bents) and those listed in any future date (the new ￿rms) is positive but statistically
insigni￿cant.
12The following result characterizes the equilibrium behavior of Tobin￿ s
average q:
Proposition 4.1 Whenever the irreversibility constraint binds q < 1; other-
wise q = 1
All proofs are given in Appendix 7.2. Proposition 4.1 explains how the
market value of a ￿rm can go lower than the replacement cost of its assets.
In a world where investment decisions are reversible, if agents have too much
capital they can then consume a portion of it and bring it back to its optimal
level. In a world where capital is irreversible, it is impossible to resort to this
mechanism. When agents have a stock of capital larger than the optimal one
irreversibility binds and the price of capital falls below one.
In the present optimal growth model, agents would never over-accumulate
capital and irreversibility would never bind. Learning about the future arrival
of a better technology - the good news shock - can make q go down because
it alters the optimal investment allocation. Sub-sections 4.2 and 4.3 below
evaluate the quantitative implications of this mechanism.
4.2 Agents learn about the future arrival of a better
technology
In period zero, agents learn about the future arrival of a better technology
(and its associated type of capital). Technology of type 2 will become avail-
able starting at period T > 0: Technology 2 is better because it has a higher
productivity level (i.e. A2 ￿ A1). However, investment in the new type of
capital is not permitted before period T. No further shocks are expected.
If the two types of capital are substitutes in the production of the ￿nal
good then good news can make the market value of old capital fall. The new
type of capital may displace old capital as an input and this will show up as
a lower price for old capital. That is the transmission channel emphasized by
13Hobijn and Jovanovic [18]. In my model F1 and F2 are perfect substitutes in
the production of the ￿nal consumption good, which maximizes the negative
impact of good news on equity prices.
4.3 Testing the theory
The equilibrium behavior of Tobin￿ s average q after the good news shock can







for all 0 ￿ t < T;
where ￿t is the multiplier associated to the irreversibility constraint of k1:
What are the implications of assuming that good news caused7 the stock
market collapse and stagnation of the mid 1970s? First, irreversibility must
bind from the time of the shock, t = 0, up to period T: Then, regardless of
the speci￿c functional forms that F1; F2 and u may take, the law of motion
of capital becomes
(4) k1;t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
tk1;0 for t = 0;:::;T:
If good news caused the 1974 drop and subsequent stagnation of q; then one
should see the capital stock of the US economy decreasing at a 5% annual
rate during the 1974-1984 period. This prediction is the opposite of the 27%
increase in the net stock of capital reported by the BEA.
In a world without capital accumulation, Hobijn and Jovanovic [18] show
that good news can explain the observed patterns in the market value to
corporate output ratio illustrated by the bold line in Figure 2 below.
7I have also studied the e⁄ects of ￿good news￿ under standard functional forms for
F1; F2 and u: Numerical simulations show that such a shock does not have any e⁄ects
on Tobin￿ s average q: Consumption for periods 0 through T can only come from the old
technology. Investment decreases as a result of the good news shock, but not all the way
to zero. Then, the irreversibility constraint does not bind and Tobin￿ s q is una⁄ected by
the shock. These results are available upon request from the author.
14Figure 2: Market and replacement value of corporate assets as ratios to
corporate output
In a one-sector Neoclassical growth model, good news cannot explain the
trends in the market to corporate output ratio. As discussed above, a contin-
uously binding irreversibility constraint is not consistent with the US capital
stock data. On the other hand, a non-binding irreversibility constraint forces
the market value of capital to equal its replacement cost. If good news caused
the 50% drop in the market value to corporate output ratio one should see
the corporate capital to corporate output ratio decreasing by 50% around
1974 and staying at that level for the following decade. Such predictions are
orthogonal to the data plotted in Figure 2.
In conclusion, once capital accumulation is introduced into the analysis,
learning about the future arrival of a better technology could neither have
caused the stock market collapse of 1974 nor the stagnation that followed.
5 Information technology revolution and pro-
ductivity slowdown
In this section I model the information technology revolution as the sudden
arrival of a new, better, technology. It is straightforward to show this shock
15causes irreversibility to bind for investment on capital of type 1. When a
better technology is available it is pointless to continue investing in the old
type of capital (which can only be used in the technology with a lower total
factor productivity). As a result, the market value of old capital declines and
Tobin￿ s average q falls below one.
The present theory implies a positive correlation between the productivity
level of the new technology relative to that of the old one and the resulting
drop in Tobin￿ s q. I will start by assuming that the IT-revolution was the
main force causing the stock market crash of 1973-74. In particular, I will
set the level of productivity of the new technology so that the model matches
the observed drop in Tobin￿ s average q: The implied equilibrium time series
from the model can then be compared to their US data counterparts. The
congruence between the theory and the data tests the consistency of the
IT-hypothesis.
5.1 The economic environment before the shock
To perform quantitative analysis one has to determine the functional forms
of the production and utility functions of the model. As is standard in the
literature, I choose a Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation for F1 and F2; so that







with 0 < ￿ < 1:
I also assume u(ct) =
c1￿￿
t
1￿￿ when ￿ 6= 1; and u(ct) = ln(ct) when ￿ = 1:
Before the shock, the technology using capital of type 2 is not available,
and investment in this type of capital must equal zero. The economy is
assumed to start at its balanced growth equilibrium. Agents expect these
conditions to prevail forever.
165.2 Unexpected arrival of Information Technologies
In period zero a new, better, technology arrives. It is better because its TFP








When taking the model to the data, period zero will be assumed to be 1974.
The equilibrium behavior of q is characterized by the following result.
Proposition 5.1 For q to be lower than 1 at least one of the irreversibility
constraints must bind.
Observe that good news would not have any impact on asset prices if
capital were not assumed to be technology-speci￿c. Otherwise, agents would
transfer capital from the old technology to the new one, irreversibility would
not bind, and Tobin￿ s average q would not change as a result of the shock.
I calibrate the model so that the share of corporate output captured
by labor and the ratios corporate investment to output, corporate capital
to output, and consumption to output match the corresponding 1959-1972
averages of the US data. The data appendix describes in greater detail the
data sources employed in this procedure. The resulting parameter values are
in the range of those found in other studies
￿ = 0:94;￿ = 0:34;￿ = 0:06; ￿y = 0:22:
The initial level of productivity of the new technology, A2;0; is chosen so that
the drop in market values predicted by the model is equal to the observed
8For q to fall at the time of the shock it is necessary for the new technology to be more
productive than the old one.
17one. In the baseline experiment A2;0 = 1:5A1;0: To give this version of the
good news hypothesis its best chance, the growth rate of A2 is set equal
to that of the old technology9. In the baseline experiment presented below
￿ = 1:5 but I discuss later on how the results change when di⁄erent values
of ￿ are considered.
This model cannot be solved analytically. To obtain an approximate so-
lution I follow Santos [32] and set up an associated numerical model with
spline interpolation. The numerical model is solved using the value function
iteration algorithm10. The results are summarized in the ￿gures below (cor-
porate GDP is in per capita real units, detrended by a 2% growth rate, and
normalized to 100 in 1972). Note that in a balanced growth equilibrium all
aggregate (detrended) quantities become constant over time. Appendix 7.1
describes the data sources used in the construction of each of the following
￿gures.
9If the new technology grew faster than the old one the theory would imply an even
stronger economic expansion.
10The source code (in Fortran 77) can be downloaded from the author￿ s web site at:
moya.bus.miami.edu/~aperalta.
18By construction, the initial drop in equity prices is equal to that in the data.
The technology shock does not a⁄ect the productivity of the old technology
but a new, better technology becomes available. Not surprisingly, corporate
output grows faster than trend (that is, at a rate higher than 2%) from the
time of the shock up to 1990, when all aggregate quantities become indis-
tinguishable from their new balanced growth levels. The model￿ s predictions
for corporate GDP are not consistent with the data. As is well known, the
mid 1970s were a period of slow economic growth.
When the shock hits there is no capital invested in the new technology.
Because the new technology is better than the existing one agents have an
incentive to save more and enjoy higher future consumption. These are the
patterns that one observes in the above ￿gures. Yet, the corporate investment
to output ratio increases by 57% at the time of the shock and stays high for
the next 15 years. In the data, investment did not change as much as what
is predicted by the model during 1973-1974, nor in the years that followed.
It is well known that the capital stock and investment data from the BEA is
subject to di⁄erent types of measurement errors. Gordon [12] has conducted
an extensive study to derive improved capital stock and investment data.
However, I have found that none of the conclusions discussed here would be
substantially changed as a result of the use of Gordon￿ s data. Moreover, his
19data ends at year 1983 and it does not allow one to compare the transition
of the model to that of the US economy. Hence, I have decided to con￿ne
my analysis to the data provided by the BEA.
Laitner and Stolyarov [22] and Hall [15] suggest that the IT-revolution
brought a technology relatively intensive in intangible capital (such as knowl-
edge). Intangible investments are not captured by the US NIPA. Thus, one
can conjecture that the explosion in GDP and investment observed in the
above graphs may be consistent with a correct measure of GDP and invest-
ment that takes into account intangible investments. However, some recent
empirical studies on the behavior of intangible capital do not validate this
conjecture. Hall [17] and Wright [36] ￿nd that intangible capital collapsed
during the mid 1970s. Li [23] measures intangible investments from the
perspective of three di⁄erent general equilibrium models and she ￿nds that
intangible capital either did not change much or decreased during the mid
1970s.
The quantitative implications of the model with respect to consumption
are also inconsistent with the US experience. The consumption to output
ratio did not fall as much as the previous simulations indicate (minus 12%
in 1974). The theory predicts a strong expansion in consumption, starting
two periods after the shock, that cannot be found in the data.
Simulations using higher values for the inter-temporal substitution pa-
rameter ￿ result in smoother graphs for corporate output, investment, and
consumption. For values of ￿ higher than 2 consumption does not fall as
much as in the baseline case, and investment does not immediately explode.
Relative to the baseline experiment, values of ￿ higher than 2 make the
model￿ s predictions for aggregate quantities more similar to the data at the
time of the shock. In the long-run, however, the model￿ s predictions for ag-
gregate quantities under di⁄erent values of ￿ are basically the same. Thus,
if one wants the model to match any substantial drop in Tobin￿ s average q a
too strong expansion in output, consumption and investment will necessarily
20follow.
Introducing adjustment costs or time-to-build would avoid the sudden
explosion in investment observed in the baseline experiment. Unfortunately,
both situations make it more di¢ cult for the theory to match the observed
drop in q. The decline in the value of old capital depends on how much better
the new technology is. If installing capital is costly then the new technology
is not as attractive, and q does not fall as much 11. Moreover, a large drop
in q can be obtained but it will be necessarily accompanied by a too strong
long-run expansion in investment, consumption and corporate output.
In conclusion, if one interprets the IT-revolution as the sudden arrival of
a better technology, then a large and persistent decline in Tobin￿ s average
q can be obtained. However, in a neoclassical competitive framework, it
must imply a strong economic expansion precisely at the time that the US
economy slowed down. Moreover, the better one wants the model to match
the observed trends in corporate GDP, consumption and investment, the
smaller the drop in Tobin￿ s average q it will predict.
5.3 Unexpected slowdown of existing production meth-
ods
The main inconsistencies of a good news based model can be resolved by
bringing into the analysis the productivity slowdown of the mid 1970s. Rel-
ative to its 1948-73 average total factor productivity growth in the United
States declined by a factor of three during 1973-1989. More importantly, the
productivity slowdown took place in sectors that did not produced, nor used
intensively, Information Technologies (cf. Jorgenson [19]).
I now take a stylized view of 1974 as a year where two unexpected shocks
occurred. The ￿rst, was a productivity slowdown in existing production
methods. This productivity slowdown makes the model consistent with the
11These simulations, and the ones for the case ￿ 6= 1:5, are available from the author
upon request.
21economic slowdown of the mid 1970s. The second shock was the arrival of
Information Technologies. The information technology revolution renders old
capital obsolete causing its market value to go down.
I calibrate the sequence of productivity parameters of old production
methods, fA1;tg, to match the productivity slowdown observed in non-IT
producing sectors reported in Jorgenson￿ s data. The sequence of productivity
parameters for the technology that depends on IT capital, fA2;tg; is assumed
to grow at a 2% rate, the same rate of growth for old technologies before the
slowdown. The initial value for A2;1974 is calibrated so as to minimize the sum
of square deviations between the model￿ s predictions for corporate output,
investment, consumption, total factor productivity and their corresponding
US data counterparts for 1974-1989. The equilibrium time series of the model
and the US data are summarized in the ￿gures below.
22The qualitative properties of the investment and consumption to output ra-
tios from the theory are similar to what we observed in the good news only
case. The information technology revolution brings a better technology and
people are willing to sacri￿ce some consumption at the time of the shock in
order to build the necessary capital. As opposed to the good news only case,
the magnitude of the ￿ uctuations in corporate investment and consumption
from the model are within the range of movements observed in the US data.
Similarly, the behavior of total factor productivity and corporate output of
the theory is qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the US data.
The unexpected productivity slowdown of old production methods generates
an economic slowdown comparable to the observed one. As the new ag-
gregate production method replaces the old one, the economy recovers in a
smooth fashion towards its new balanced growth equilibrium.
The quantitative implications for asset prices of the two shocks of 1974 are
illustrated by Figure 3. The unexpected arrival of information technologies
paired with the productivity slowdown generate a 20% drop in Tobin￿ s aver-
age q. Old capital is left to depreciate and it is gradually replaced by a new
one. After the shocks, market values recover in a smooth fashion. The recov-
ery takes longer than 15 years, which is also compatible with the US data.
The model￿ s Tobin￿ s q, however, recovers faster than its US counterpart.
Figure 3: Quantitative Implications of the two shocks of 1974 for Tobin￿ s q.
236 Conclusions
This study employs general equilibrium theory to quantitatively test the
idea that the Information Technology revolution caused the stock market
collapse of the mid 1970s, its subsequent stagnation, and recovery. The
tool of analysis was a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model with
technology-speci￿c capital and irreversible investment. Theory showed that
news about the future availability of a better technology cannot deliver a
consistent explanation for the observed patterns in equity prices and those
in corporate output, capital, and consumption. I assessed another type of
good news shock consisting of the actual arrival of a new, better technology.
The model can make q fall as much as in the data, but it must also imply a
two-fold increase in investment, and a strong economic expansion precisely
at the time that the US economy slowed down.
The good news hypothesis can deliver a large and persistent drop in To-
bin￿ s average q; which is one of the most striking features of the data. Yet,
within a neoclassical framework, this hypothesis always predicts a counter-
factual expansion in aggregate quantities. I found, however, that when one
takes into account the observed productivity slowdown in old production
methods then the trends in the equilibrium time series of the model are com-
patible with the data. Moreover, almost one half of the observed drop in the
market value of US corporations can be accounted for.
My results reinforce Sargent￿ s view that any general equilibrium theory
of stock market ￿ uctuations must ￿necessarily stem from a model in which
￿ frictions￿are present that prevent the price of existing capital from being
driven equal at all times to the price of newly produced capital.￿ 12 Theory
shows that for such frictions to have any equilibrium e⁄ect on asset prices, it
is necessary that agents ￿nd, suddenly, a better place to allocate investment
resources. Good news seem then essential for the construction of a successful
12Sargent [33], page 1.
24model.
Finally, from the quantitative analysis in this paper, one can see that
one of the main challenges for any general equilibrium theory of equity price
movements resides in accounting for the long stagnation of Tobin￿ s average
q: In my model, market values start recovering right after the shock hits
while the data shows a decade long stagnation. Reconciling the magnitude
of the drop in market values with the observed trends of key macroeconomic
aggregates, in particular investment and consumption, seems also challeng-
ing. The lower the values of q that one demands from the model, the better
the new technology has to be, and the larger the jump in investment and
consumption that the model may deliver. Constructing credible ways for
overcoming these problems demands further research.
7 Appendix
7.1 Data
Figure 1. Ratio of Market Value to Replacement Cost of Tangible Assets
for Corporations
Market value of corporations was constructed using data from the Flow of
Funds Accounts of the United States (FOF) issued by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (FRB).13 In FFA, domestic corporations are
divided into non￿nancial and ￿nancial corporate business. Financial corpo-
rations are further divided to the following categories as listed in Table F.213:
Commercial banking, life insurance companies, other insurance companies,
closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, real estate investment trusts (RE-
ITs) and brokers and dealers.
My measure of market value re￿ ects both equity value and debt of all
domestic corporations. All direct or indirect (through mutual funds) inter-
13This data can be downloaded from the FRB website at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/data.htm.
25corporate holdings of corporate equity and debt has been netted out. To that
e⁄ect market value of domestic corporations (MV) has been constructed as
follows:
MV = Corporate equity issued by non￿nancial corp. business (Table L.213 Line 2)
+ Corporate equity issued by ￿nancial corp. (Table L.213 Line 4)
+ Total liabilities of nonfarm non￿nancial corp. business (Table L.102 Line 20)
￿ Total ￿nancial assets of security brokers and dealers (Table L.130 Line 1)
￿ Total ￿nancial assets of nonfarm non￿nancial corp. business (Table L.102 Line 1)
+ Total liabilities of commercial banking (Table L.109 Line 21)
￿ Total ￿nancial assets of commercial banking (Table L.109 Line 1)
+ Total liabilities of life insurance companies (Table L.117 Line 16)
￿ Total ￿nancial assets of life insurance companies (Table L.117 Line 1)
+ Total liabilities of other insurance companies (Table L.118 Line 14)
￿ Total ￿nancial assets of other insurance companies (Table L.118 Line 1)
+ Total liabilities of closed-end funds (Table L.123 Line 7)
￿ Total ￿nancial assets of closed-end funds (Table L.123 Line 1)
+ Total liabilities of exchange-traded funds (Table L.123 Line 13)
￿ Total ￿nancial assets of exchange-traded funds (Table L.123 Line 8)
+ Total liabilities of REITs (Table L.129 Line 11)
￿ Total ￿nancial assets of REITs (Table L.129 Line 1)
+ Total liabilities of security brokers and dealers (Table L.130 Line 13)
Replacement cost of tangible assets of corporations was constructed using
data from the Fixed Assets Tables (FA) reported by the Bureau of Economic
26Analysis (BEA)14 and also from the FOF. My measure of tangible assets
includes all nonresidential and residential ￿xed assets, plus inventories. Cor-
porate ￿xed assets are the sum of corporate nonresidential ￿xed assets (FA
Table 4.1 Line 13) and corporate residential ￿xed assets (FA Table 5.1 Line
3). Stock of inventories held by nonfarm non￿nancial corporations is from
FOF Table B.102 Line 5. I assumed ￿nancial corporations hold no inven-
tories as their inventory investment is zero in the product account, and I
ignored the inventories held by farm corporations, since they are negligibly
small.
Macroeconomic data for the ￿gures in section 5
The data on corporate GDP is taken from NIPA￿ s Table 1.14. (Gross
Value Added of Domestic Corporate Business in Current Dollars and Gross
Value Added of Non￿nancial Domestic Corporate Business in Current and
Chained Dollars). Corporate Investment is the sum of non-residential and
residential corporate investment from BEA￿ s Fixed Asset Tables, tables 4.7
and 5.7. To compute total factor productivity I apply the aggregate produc-
tion function from the model and obtain TFP solving from the equation




Corporate capital, kt, is the sum of non-residential and residential corpo-
rate capital, as reported in the BEA￿ s Fixed Asset Tables, tables 4.2 and
5.2(chained quantity indexes). The behavior of hours worked int he corpo-
rate sector is computed as follows:
nt+1
nt =Factor of change in ours worked in private industries￿change in the
fraction of private employment accounted for US corporations
The data on hours worked is taken from the BLS series ID CES0500000040.
The data on employment by form of organization is taken from the US Census
14This data can be downloaded from the BEA website at
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/faweb/AllFATables.asp.
27bureau.
Finally, to make the US NIPA data compatible with the measures of our
model, consumption data is obtained from the aggregate feasibility condition
c = (1 ￿ ￿y)GDP ￿ investment
7.2 Proofs
Proof of proposition 4.1
The consumer￿ s ￿rst order conditions with respect to st+1 and ct imply
(5) ptVt = pt+1 (dt+1 + Vt+1):
On the other hand, the ￿rm￿ s ￿rst order condition with respect to k1;t+1
delivers
(6) pt ￿ ￿t = pt+1 [(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿y)F1(k1;t+1;0;Atnt)] ￿ ￿t+1(1 ￿ ￿);
where ￿t is the multiplier of the irreversibility constraint (1). The share of
total after tax output going to labor is 1 ￿ ￿; and dividends equal
dt+1 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿y)F(k1;t+2;0;At+2nt+2) ￿ x1;t+1:
One can multiply both sides of (6) by k1;t+1 and use the homogeneity of F,
the law of motion of capital, and the above expression for dividends to get
(7) (pt ￿ ￿t)k1;t+1 = (pt+1 ￿ ￿t+1)k1;t+2 + pt+1dt+1:














ptdt + (pT ￿ ￿T)k1;T+1
)
(9)
ptVt ￿ pt+1Vt+1 = (pt ￿ ￿t)k1;t+1 ￿ (pt+1 ￿ ￿t+1)k1;t+2: (10)
It is well known that, in equilibrium, all variables converge to a balanced
growth path, which is independent of the given initial conditions (cf. Arrow
and Kurz [2], or Olson [26]). In a balanced growth path investment is strictly
positive and thus, by continuity, there is a ￿; large enough, such that for all
t ￿ ￿ investment is strictly positive, and ￿t = 0: Hence, equations (8), (9), the
transversality condition for the problem of the ￿rm [limT!1 pTk1;T+1 = 0];
the one for the consumer [limT!1 pTVTsT+1 = 0], and the market clearing
condition (st = 1 for all t) imply V0 = (1 ￿ ￿0)k1. Using this as an initial
condition for the di⁄erence equation in (10) delivers the following relationship
between the market value of a ￿rm and its capital stock
(11) Vt = (1 ￿
￿t
pt
)k1;t+1 for all t:
To prove the ￿rst statement of the proposition note that ￿t is strictly positive
only when the irreversibility constraint binds; in that case, equation (11) says
Vt < kt+1: The de￿nition of q delivers qt < 1: To prove the second one assume
the irreversibility constraint does not bind, then ￿t = 0, Vt = kt+1 and qt = 1:
QED
Lemma 4.1: Under the assumptions outlined in section three, if news
about the future arrival of a better technology arrives at date 0 then
qt = (1 ￿
￿t
pt
); for all t < T:
29Proof: Notice that equations (3), (4) and (5) are still ￿rst order conditions
of the problem of the ￿rm, and of the consumer, for all periods 0 ￿ t < T.
Hence, for all t < T one can still derive
ptVt ￿ pt+1Vt+1 = (pt ￿ ￿t)k1;t+1 ￿ (pt+1 ￿ ￿t+1)k1;t+2:
The transversality condition of the consumer does not depend on the partic-
ular time period one is considering so that











Relative to the situation considered by proposition 4.1, equations (8) and
(11) have to be changed to take into account the future availability of cap-
ital of type 2. Consider now all periods in which both types of capital are
available. The ￿rst order conditions of the ￿rm￿ s problem with respect to
k1t+1;k2t+1;x1t;x2t can be used to derive
(pt ￿ ￿t)k1;t+1 + (pt ￿ ￿2t)k2;t+1 = (pt+1 ￿ ￿t+1)k1;t+2+ (13)
(pt+1 ￿ ￿2t+1)k2;t+2 + pt+1dt+1;
where ￿2t denotes the multiplier associated to the irreversibility constraint
for capital of type 2. Using this, and the ￿rst order condition of the consumer
(6), yields
ptVt ￿ pt+1Vt+1 = (pt ￿ ￿t)k1;t+1 + (pt ￿ ￿2t)k2;t+1
￿ (pt+1 ￿ ￿t+1)k1;t+2 ￿ (pt+1 ￿ ￿2t+1)k2;t+2:
30Finally, using (12) one gets




pidi + (p￿ ￿ ￿￿)k1;￿+1+
+ (p￿ ￿ ￿2￿)k2;￿+1g
which, by the transversality condition of the problem of the ￿rm, renders



















Proof of proposition 5.1















where ￿1t and ￿2t are the multipliers of the irreversibility constraints for each
















and note that if none of the irreversibility constraints bind both multipliers
will equal zero. Hence, qt = 1: QED
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